Can a volunteer be a ‘worker’ in relation to activities for which they are paid?

Yes, says the Court of Appeal in Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom

Background: There are three main types of employment status: employee, worker and self-employed. Getting this right matters because it determines an individual’s legal rights. Employees have the most rights, the self-employed the least, and workers fall somewhere in between.

A ‘worker’ is broadly someone who personally provides services under a contract, but is not genuinely running their own business with the employer as a client. Workers are entitled to key protections such as the National Living Wage, paid holiday and accompaniment at disciplinary or grievance hearings. Ultimately, employment status depends on the reality of the working relationship in practice, not just what the contract says.

Facts: Mr Groom, the volunteer, was a ‘coastal rescue officer’ for the Coastal Rescue Service (the rescue service). The volunteer handbook described his relationship with the rescue service as a ‘voluntary two-way commitment where no contract of employment exists’.

Mr Groom (in common with all volunteers) was expected to comply with a code of conduct which, amongst other things, required coastal rescue officers to attend a number of training sessions and to maintain a reasonable level of attendance at incidents. The code of conduct also said that volunteers could submit monthly payment claims for certain activities to cover minor costs and to compensate volunteers for disruption to their personal life caused by unsocial hours call-outs. Payments included payment for time (at an hourly rate of remuneration), travel and expenses with a calculation of amounts payable for different specified things, at different rates for different roles. Payment was by payslip and P60s were issued at the end of tax year.

The rescue service terminated the relationship with Mr Groom following a disciplinary hearing (and he was subsequently issued with a P45). Mr Groom brought a Tribunal claim on the basis that the rescue service had failed to allow him to be accompanied to the disciplinary hearing. To qualify for this right, he needed to be classified as a ‘worker’.

As it was accepted that Mr Groom was required to personally perform his volunteer services (and the rescue service was not a customer or client) the only issue for the Tribunal to consider was whether a contract existed.

Tribunal decision: The Tribunal said that Mr Groom was not a ‘worker’ as he did not have a contract with the rescue service. This was because there was no automatic right to remuneration for any activity and, in reality, many volunteers never claimed for this. Mr Groom appealed to the EAT.

EAT decision: The EAT allowed Mr Groom’s appeal. It said there was a contract in place when Mr Groom was carrying out activities that attracted a right of remuneration.

The EAT said that the phrase ‘two-way commitment’ in the volunteer handbook and the specified levels of training and attendance at incidents indicated some form of mutual obligation. It was irrelevant that Mr Groom had to apply for the remuneration – this was no more than a payment mechanism and had no impact on the issue of his status. It was also irrelevant that other volunteers hadn’t made claims for payment. The rescue service appealed.

Court of Appeal decision: The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the EAT’s decision. The Court emphasised that it was not deciding whether Mr Groom was an employee, nor whether there was an overarching contract between call-outs. The sole question was whether, on each occasion he attended an activity that entitled him to claim payment, he was a worker.

The Court said that a contract came into effect each time Mr Groom undertook an activity for which payment was promised. At those moments, there was a classic wage–work bargain: he performed work personally and the rescue agency was obliged to pay if he submitted a claim. Mutuality of obligation existed during those paid activities, even though there was no overarching ‘umbrella’ contract governing the relationship as a whole.

Implications: This decision has important implications for charities and other organisations that rely on volunteers. It highlights the risk that certain arrangements - particularly where payments are involved - can give rise to worker status and, in turn, statutory rights.

A key takeaway is that labels and written agreements are not decisive. As seen in Groom, courts will look beyond the documentation to the reality of the relationship. Simply describing someone as a ‘volunteer’ or stating that they are not a worker will not prevent worker status if, in practice, there is a wage/work bargain.

Payments are a key risk area. Genuine expenses are usually safe, but payments linked to time, availability or disruption may point towards worker status, especially if there is any entitlement to pay.

Control also matters. Even if volunteers can choose whether to accept work, if they are closely managed and paid for their time whilst working, they may be treated as ‘workers’.

Overall, organisations that use volunteers should review arrangements carefully and how they are documented. Take care before deciding that a volunteer is not a worker and denying statutory rights. Even arrangements described as ‘voluntary’ can give rise to worker status - particularly if payment is part of the deal; even if this is irregular.